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The aim of this article is to examine a series of recent contributions to the reading of 
Marx’s Capital that stress its specific determination as a dialectical investigation of 
objectified or fetishised forms of social mediation in capitalist society: on the one 
hand, the so-called Neue Marx-Lektüre originated in Germany towards the end of the 
1960s and, on the other, the more widely circulated work of authors associated with 
so-called Open Marxism. The interesting aspect of these works is that they draw the 
implications of Marx’s critique of political economy not only for the comprehension of 
the fetishised forms of social objectivity in capitalism, but also for the comprehension 
of the forms of subjectivity of the modern individual. More specifically, all these 
contributions broadly share the insightful view that the content of the simplest 
determination of human individuality in the capitalist mode of production is its 
alienated existence as ‘personification of economic categories’. However, this article 
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argues that the limits of these perspectives become apparent when it comes to 
uncovering the grounds of the revolutionary form of subjectivity which carries the 
potentiality to transcend capitalist alienation.  For these perspectives fail to ground 
the revolutionary form of subjectivity in the immanent unfolding of capitalist forms of 
social mediation. In the case of the Neue Marx-Lektüre, it quite simply leaves the 
problematique of the revolutionary subject outside the scope of the critique of 
political economy. In the case of Open Marxism, despite valiant attempts at 
overcoming all exteriority in their conceptualisation of the relationship between 
human subjectivity and capital, they end up grounding the revolutionary 
transformative powers of the working class outside the latter’s alienated existence as 
personification of economic categories; more specifically, in an abstract humanity 
lacking in social determinations. In contrast to these perspectives, this paper 
develops an alternative approach to the Marxian critique of political economy which 
provides an account of the revolutionary potentialities of the working class as 
immanent in its full determination as an attribute of the alienated or fetishised 
movement of the capital-form. 
 





The aim of this article is to examine a series of recent contributions to the reading of 
Marx’s Capital that stress its specific determination as a dialectical investigation of 
objectified or fetishised forms of social mediation in capitalist society. In the first 
place, I critically engage with the contribution by authors associated with the so-
called Neue Marx-Lektüre originated in Germany towards the end of the 1960s 
(Backhaus 1980, 1992, 2005; Reichelt 1982, 1995, 2005, 2007; Heinrich 2009; Fineschi 
2009). Secondly, I also scrutinize the more widely circulated work of authors 
associated with so-called Open Marxism (Bonefeld y Holloway 1991; Bonefeld, Gunn 
y Psychopedis 1992a, 1992b; Bonefeld, Holloway y Psychopedis 1995; Bonefeld y 
Psychopedis 2005). In this latter case, I shall particularly focus on Werner Bonefeld’s 
contribution (1992, 1993, 1995, 2014), who explicitly draws intellectual inspiration from 
Backhaus’s and Reichelt’s ideas (Bonefeld 1998, 2001, 2014), albeit within a 
framework which is more overtly political.1 Furthermore, I shall discuss Richard 
Gunn’s more ‘philosophically-minded’ take on Open Marxist themes, which probably 
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constitutes the more sophisticated and rigorous contribution to the methodological 
dimension of this approach (Gunn 1987, 1989, 1992). 
 In my view, perhaps the most interesting aspect of all these works is that they 
draw the implications of Marx’s critique of political economy not only for the 
comprehension of the fetishised forms of social objectivity in capitalism, but also for 
the comprehension of the forms of subjectivity of the modern individual. In effect, all 
these contributions broadly share the view, correct as I see it, that the content of the 
simplest determination of human individuality in the capitalist mode of production is 
its alienated existence as personification of ‘economic categories’. However, I shall 
show below that the limits of these perspectives become apparent when it comes to 
uncovering the grounds of the form of subjectivity which carries the immanent 
potentiality to transcend capitalist alienation, that is, when it comes to bring to light 
the determinations of the revolutionary subject.       
In order to substantiate this argument, this article starts out by offering an in 
depth and detailed critical discussion of the Neue Marx-Lektüre and the Open 
Marxist approach, arguing that these authors fail to ground the emergence of 
revolutionary subjectivity in the immanent unfolding of capitalist forms of social 
mediation. In the former case, quite simply by leaving the problematique of the 
revolutionary subject outside the scope of the critique of political economy. In the 
case of Open Marxism, despite its valiant attempts at overcoming all exteriority in 
their conceptualisation of the relationship between human subjectivity and capital, 
they end up grounding the revolutionary transformative powers of the working class 
outside the latter’s alienated existence as ‘personification of economic categories’; 
more specifically, they end up grounding it in an abstract humanity lacking in social 
determinations. 
Furthermore, the article develops this critical discussion along methodological 
lines demonstrating that the substantive weaknesses of both the Neue Marx-Lektüre 
and Open Marxism go hand in hand with an inadequate conception of the scientific-
critical method needed immanently to discover the determinations of revolutionary 
subjectivity. More concretely, for these authors the Marxian scientific-critical method 
underlying the discovery of revolutionary praxis simply boils down to the analytic 
movement entailed by the ‘reductio ad hominem’, through which the dialectical 
investigation traces the human origin of economic categories. The ‘genetic’ or 
‘synthetic’ aspect of dialectics is thus relegated to the role of explaining the social 
constitution of the forms of objectivity of capitalist society and, at most, of the forms 
of subjectivity that bear their reproduction. However, according to this conception, 
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this second moment of the dialectical investigation has no role to play with regards 
to the comprehension of the foundations of revolutionary subjectivity. 
In contrast to these perspectives, I develop an alternative approach inspired by 
the contribution to the critique of political economy of the Argentine scholar Juan 
Iñigo Carrera (1992, 2007, 2013) which, insofar as it attempts to provide an account of 
the revolutionary potentialities of the working class as immanent in its full 
determination as ‘personification’ of the movement of capital, differs from the two 
readings just outlined on the following two key methodological dimensions. In the 
first place, it is argued that insofar as revolutionary subjectivity is a ‘unity of many 
determinations’, its ground cannot be found at the ‘level of abstraction’ of commodity 
fetishism, as implicitly follows from the Neue Marx-Lektüre and the Open Marxist 
approach. In the second place, and as a consequence, it is shown that the critical 
moment of the Marxian dialectical method does not simply consist of the reductio ad 
hominem. The latter undoubtedly is the essentially analytic and Feuerbach-inspired 
approach deployed by Marx in early texts such as the 1844 Paris Manuscripts. 
However, I maintain that Marx overcame the limits of the latter methodological 
perspective in the ‘mature’ versions of his critique of political economy (the 
Grundrisse, the 1859 Contribution and, especially, Capital). In effect, in these latter 
works the discovery of revolutionary subjectivity immanently emerges out of the 
synthetic unfolding of the totality of form determinations of capital as the alienated 
concrete subject of the movement of modern society, with the commodity form as its 
necessary yet only simplest expression (and hence as the point of departure of the 
dialectical presentation which culminates with revolutionary subjectivity).         
   
 
Method and practical critique from the Neue Marx-Lektüre to Open 
Marxism 
 
Backhaus’s and Reichelt’s Neue Marx-Lektüre  
 
We pointed out above that both the Neue Marx-Lektüre and its more politicised 
reception by Open Marxism in the Anglophone world share a particular conception 
of the method and significance of the Marxian critique of the fetishised forms of 
capitalist social mediation. In effect, in their reducing the critical moment of the 
investigation of commodity fetishism to the mere discovery of the human content 
behind the alienated objectivity of economic categories, it can be argued that these 
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authors develop what I have elsewhere termed a ‘Feuerbachian’ reading of this 
aspect of Marx’s method in his ‘mature’ works (Starosta 2015). In other words, what 
eventuates is a variation of what Avineri referred to in his classic book as the method 
of transformative criticism that the young Marx had taken over from the author of The 
Essence of Christianity (Avineri 1993). In this sense, it would seem that there would 
be no essential methodological difference between the critical method of Capital 
and that which structures Marx’s first attempt at the critique of political economy in 
the 1844 Paris Manuscripts. The only difference would be that in Marx’s later texts, he 
not only reduces alienated social forms to its human content but also answers (or 
does so more fully) the question as to why that content takes on such a fetishised 
form.  
But ‘if the point is to change the world’, then the subsequent problem is how to 
turn the insight in the human basis of the alienated objectivity of economic 
categories into practical critique, that is, how to convert it into emancipating 
conscious practice. And it is here where, eventually, the recourse to a moment of 
exteriority to capitalist social relations tends to creep in as the source of the 
transformative powers of revolutionary action. Broadly put, for such Marxists the 
transformative powers of our action are located not in commodity-determined 
practice itself, but in the essential character of an abstract material content deprived 
of social determinations which is deemed ‘logically’ prior to its perverted social form 
as value-producing, albeit only appearing and existing immanently in and through it. 
For those readings, this mere discovery of the human content of ‘economic 
categories’ exhausts the thinking needed consciously to organise the practical 
critique of capitalism. Let us examine this matter more closely through a discussion 
of some of these contributions. 
Perhaps a good place to start is the work of Hans-Georg Backhaus, who 
explicitly traces the Feuerbachian lineage of Marx’s method of critique. According to 
Backhaus, from an initial application ‘in his critique of the metaphysical theory of the 
state’, Marx expanded the scope of this method to economic objects as material 
forms of self-estrangement, commensurable to its metaphysical and theological 
forms (Backhaus 2005, pp. 18–19). This ‘critical genetic method’ is said to have two 
main aspects – the critical and the anthropological. The former does not simply 
consist in describing and denouncing the existing contradictions between dogmas 
and institutions, but centrally aims at explicating the inner genesis or necessity of 
those contradictions (Backhaus 2005, p. 19). In turn, the anthropological aspect of the 
method involves an ad hominem reduction, the demonstration of the human basis of 
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the economic object as a material form of self-estrangement, which is thus rendered 
in its totality as an object of critique (ibid.). The critique of economic categories thus 
entails the transcendence of the economic standpoint (Backhaus 2005, p. 23). 
In Backhaus’s reading, this ‘application’ of the ‘critical genetic method’ to the 
discipline of economics is employed by Marx not only in his early writings (an 
indisputable fact as I see it), but also in his mature critique of political economy 
(Backhaus 2005, pp. 21ss). The main thrust of the critique remains the same: whilst 
economics:  
 
accept[s] economic forms and categories without thought, that is in an 
unreflective manner … Marx, in contrast, seeks to ‘derive’ these forms and 
categories as inverted forms of social relations (Backhaus 2005, p. 21).   
  
The ‘dialectical method of exposition’ is thus essentially seen as the genetic 
development of those alienated forms of objectivity out of human sensuous practice. 
(Backhaus 2005, p. 22). The general method of critique does not change in this 
reading, only its terminology (Backhaus 2005, p. 25). In the words of Backhaus 
himself: 
 
In variation of this thought process, Marx argues in the mature Critique of 1859 
that what the economists ‘have just ponderously described as a thing 
reappears as a social relation and, a moment later, having been defined as a 
social relation, teases them once more as a thing’ (Marx 1971, p. 35). If one 
replaces ‘social relation’ by ‘appearance of humanness’ and thing qua ‘value 
thing’ by the thing in ‘difference from humanness’ that, as a transcendental 
thing, is transposed in a sphere ‘outside of Man’, then the continuity of the 
fundamental character of Marx’s critique of economics from the early writing 
to Capital becomes sufficiently clear (Backhaus 2005, p. 25). 
 
 Now, lest my argument be misread, my claim is not that these contributions 
from the Neue Lektüre see no methodological change whatsoever between Marx’s 
early critique of economics and his mature version. My point is that they do not posit 
any change insofar as the nature of critique is concerned: the reductio ad hominem 
is considered to be the continuing ground for revolutionary praxis (Reichelt 2005, p. 
38). Yet, this novel reading does develop two additional methodological elements 
which are relevant for the purpose of the present discussion. 
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In the first place, these authors argue that in Marx’s mature critique, the 
genetic aspect of his method is not simply predicated on Feuerbach. Insofar as the 
‘inverted world of capital’ (as self-valorising value) resembles Hegel’s second 
supersensible world, ‘which in its reality … contains within itself … both the sensuous 
and the first supersensible world’, (Reichelt 2005, p. 32), Marx’s mature critique also 
drew on Hegel’s logic for the ‘dialectical development of categories’ (Reichelt 2005, p. 
43). In other words, Hegel’s dialectical method provided Marx with the general form 
of motion of synthetic exposition of the necessary sequence of form-determinations 
understood as ‘objective forms of thought’ (Reichelt 2005, p. 57).  
Secondly, taking cue from Adorno’s concept of society as the ‘unity of subject 
and object’, (Backhaus 1992, p. 56), which involves ‘an ongoing process of inversion 
of subjectivity and objectivity, and vice versa’, (Backhaus 1992, p. 60), both Backhaus 
and Reichelt posit the alienated determination of human beings as ‘personifications 
of economic categories’ or ‘character masks’, as a central element of Marx’s 
dialectical method in Capital (Backhaus 1992, p. 60; Reichelt 1982, p. 168). While this 
insight could be a promising programmatic starting point for an attempt at a critical 
investigation of the determinations of revolutionary subjectivity, this is not a path that 
these German scholars follow. Their discussion unfortunately tends to remain at a 
very high level of abstraction, dealing with the simpler form determinations of capital. 
As Endnotes 2 write, ‘class plays little role in the writings of Backhaus and Reichelt 
and they treat the question of revolution as outside their field of academic expertise’ 
(Endnotes 2010, p. 99).2 Nonetheless, it is possible to examine the practical 
implications of this approach by turning to the work of Werner Bonefeld who, as 
stated above, has not only introduced it into Anglophone Marxism, but also 
developed it further along resolutely political lines, i.e. by putting the revolutionary 
class struggle at the centre of his investigation (Endnotes 2010, p. 98).3 
 
Bringing Politics into the Neue Marx-Lektüre: Bonefeld and Open Marxism 
 
A recent article by Bonefeld on Adorno and social praxis is a fertile ground to discuss 
this issue. The starting point of Bonefeld’s discussion is the recognition that in 
capitalism the ‘subject’s objectification exists in an inverted form, in which the thing 
subjectifies itself in the person, and the person objectifies him- or herself in the thing’ 
(Bonefeld 2012, p. 125). In other words, Bonefeld takes up the Adornian insight, which 
originally triggered the Neue Marx-Lektüre (Reichelt 1982), that in this society 
individuals become determined as ‘character masks’ or ‘agents of value’: their social 
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activity becomes the activity of ‘personifications of economic categories’ (Bonefeld 
2012, p. 124). In more overtly Adornian terms, Bonefeld speaks of this phenomenon 
as involving a specific ‘objective conceptuality’, which ‘holds sway in reality (Sache) 
itself’ (Bonefeld 2012, pp. 125–6). However, unlike Backhaus and Reichelt, Bonefeld 
explicitly poses the question of the implication of this form-determination of human 
individuality for emancipatory praxis, i.e. for revolutionary class struggle: 
 
The critique of political economy is not satisfied with perpetuating the labourer. 
Its reasoning is subversive of all relations of human indignity. Subversion is not 
the business of alternative elites that seek revolution as mere conformist 
rebellion – a revolution for the perpetuation of wage slavery. Their business is 
to lead labour, not its self-emancipation. Subversion aims at general human 
emancipation (Bonefeld 2010a, pp. 62–3). 
 
 The interesting thing about Bonefeld’s answer to this question is that, at least 
in principle, he explicitly rejects those attempts at grounding ‘resistance’ against 
reification in an ‘asserted subject conceived in contradistinction to society’, and 
whose transhistorical basis would be the worker’s ‘humanity and soul’ (Lukács), ‘the 
inner transcendence of matter’ (Bloch), a ‘materialist instinct’ (Negt and Kluge), or 
biopower (Hardt and Negri) (Bonefeld 2012, p. 131). In other words, Bonefeld is at 
pains not to relapse into any exteriority to the perverted forms of existence of the 
social individual as the ground for the revolutionary subject: 
 
And Adorno? He would have none of this. The idea that there is a world out 
there that has not yet been colonized by the logic of things is nonsensical. 
Instead of a concept of society, these differentiations of society into system 
and soul/transcendent matter/materialist instinct/bio-power separate what 
belongs together (Bonefeld 2012, p. 131). 
 
 Bonefeld elaborates further on this through a ‘philosophical’ discussion of 
Hegel’s conception of the relation between essence and appearance (Bonefeld 2012, 
pp. 127–8). Essence, he argues following Hegel, has to appear (it cannot choose not 
to do so). Moreover, this appearance is its (only) mode of existence. This means that 
there is no exteriority to essence’s actual manifestation, however perverted the latter 
might be: ‘its appearance is thus at the same time its disappearance’ (Bonefeld 2012, 
p. 128). Translated into social theory, this philosophical argument means that human 
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sensuous practice (essence) does exist as personification of economic categories 
(appearance), and that this inversion is no mere subjective illusion, but is all too real. 
Now, whilst this certainly allows Bonefeld to formally avoid relapsing into an 
externality between human subject and society, it begs the question as to how to 
avoid the political dead-end to which Adorno pessimistically succumbed? In other 
words, the question arises as to how to avoid the conclusion that ‘there could be no 
such thing as emancipatory praxis because the reified world of bourgeois society 
would only allow reified activity’ (Bonefeld 2012, p. 124)? 
 Here lies the crux of the matter, because, in my view, Bonefeld can remain true 
to the project of emancipatory praxis only by backtracking on his declamation to 
reject any exteriority between ‘essence’ and ‘appearance’. Thus, right after claiming 
that the former vanishes in the latter, he endorses Adorno’s claim in Negative 
Dialectics that ‘objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder’ 
since ‘the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived’ (Adorno 1992, p. 13). 
According to Bonefeld, the critical move consists in ‘opening the non-conceptual 
within the concept’ (Bonefeld 2012, p. 130). This non-conceptual content, Bonefeld 
further argues, ‘subsists within its concept but cannot be reduced to it’ (Bonefeld 
2012, p. 130, my emphasis). Crucially, it is this moment of irreducibility of the content 
which, in its simplicity and unmediatedness, constitutes the ground of revolutionary 
subjectivity. In other words, the latter is seen by Bonefeld as the expression of the 
direct affirmation of the (‘non-conceptual’) content. The fact that he does not see this 
affirmation as a pure positivity but only as negation of ‘the negative human condition’ 
(Bonefeld 2012, p. 130) makes no difference. The point is that the immediate ‘source’ 
of that negativity is located in the (formless) content itself: ‘Subversion is able to 
negate the established order because it is “man” made’ (Bonefeld 2010, p. 66). The 
postulate of immanence between content and form ultimately thereby remains just a 
formal declaration which is belied as the argument unfolds. In the end, an element of 
exteriority to alienated social practice creeps back in as the residual ‘substance’ of 
revolutionary subjectivity.4 
We shall return below to the substantive shortcomings of this kind of 
approach. Here the important point to address is the implication of this conception of 
revolutionary subjectivity for the meaning of science as critique. Briefly put, for 
Bonefeld, dialectical critique comes down to the demystification of ‘economic 
categories’ by revealing their social constitution as perverted modes of existence of 
human activity, that is, by discovering sensuous practice as the negated content 
behind those reified forms of social mediation (Bonefeld 2001, pp. 56–9; and 2012, p. 
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127). What follows from this is that, for Bonefeld, the ‘subversive’ moment of Marx’s 
methodological programme is essentially analytic: it consists in the discovery of the 
content of a determinate form. Drawing on the work of Backhaus commented on 
above (Bonefeld 1998), it is through reductio ad hominem that science as critique 
provides enlightenment on revolutionary practice.  
The problem with this approach is, as argued elsewhere (Starosta 2008; 
Caligaris and Starosta 2014), that dialectical analysis is actually incapable of offering 
an explanation (hence comprehension) of the raison d’être of determinate concrete 
forms of reality. In moving ‘backwards’ from concrete form to content, dialectical 
analysis can at most reveal what are the more abstract determinations whose 
realisation is presupposed and carried by the immediate concrete form under 
scrutiny. But it cannot account for its ‘why’ (i.e. its fully unfolded immanent necessity). 
In this sense, although it does comprise a necessary methodological stage of 
dialectical research, the analytical discovery of the human content of fetishised 
relations between things can shed little light on the comprehension of revolutionary 
subjectivity. In fact, that was the scientific achievement of the Marxian critique of 
political economy as early as in the 1844 Paris Manuscripts, which allowed him to 
grasp the simplest (human) determination behind the content and form of the 
abolition of the fetishism of capitalist social relations (Starosta 2015, Chapter 1). But 
the whole point of Marx’s subsequent scientific endeavour was precisely to advance 
in the comprehension of the further mediations entailed by the material and social 
constitution of the revolutionary subject, which could only be the result of their 
synthetic ideal reproduction. 
Evidently, this presupposes that one considers that there actually are further 
mediations that need to be unfolded synthetically in order fully to comprehend 
revolutionary practice. But this is what Bonefeld’s approach denies. As I have argued, 
despite his critique of other perspectives that resort to the immediacy of ‘an asserted 
subject externally counterposed to society’, his own endeavour ultimately finds the 
immanent ground of revolutionary subjectivity in something simple and unmediated, 
i.e. the abstract materiality of ‘sensuous human practice’ which ‘lives within and 
through relations between things’. Bonefeld’s restriction of the subversive moment of 
dialectical critique to analysis is therefore perfectly coherent on this score. In his 
view, when it comes to revolutionary subjectivity, there are actually no 
determinations at stake, there is nothing to be explained. In other words, the 
revolutionary abolition of capital has no material, social or historical immanent 
necessity Bonefeld (2010, p. 64).5 Its only ‘necessity’ is moral, the practical realisation 
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of the ‘communist categorical imperative of human emancipation’ (Bonefeld 2010, 
pp. 66, 77). In brief, the revolutionary abolition of capital is the result of an abstractly 
free and socially autonomous political action, represented as the absolute opposite 
of the alienated automatism of the capital form (albeit one that can only exist as 
‘negativity’, i.e. in the struggles ‘in and against’ capitalist oppression):  
 
The existence of the labourer as an economic category does therefore not 
entail reduction of consciousness to economic consciousness. It entails the 
concept of economy as an experienced concept, and economic 
consciousness as an experienced consciousness. At the very least, economic 
consciousness is an unhappy consciousness. It is this consciousness that 
demands reconciliation: freedom turns concrete in the changing forms of 
repression as resistance to repression (Bonefeld 2010, p. 71). 
 
 It follows that the only thing that actually requires explanation is the social 
constitution of the fetishised forms of objectivity in which human practice exists in 
capitalism. In this sense, Bonefeld acknowledges that the critical power of the 
dialectical method involves not only analysis, but also, fundamentally, synthetic or 
‘genetic’ reproduction. Thus, in an article on the meaning of critique, he approvingly 
quotes Marx’s methodological remark that  
 
It is, in reality, much easier to discover by analysis the earthly kernel of the 
misty creations of religion than to do the opposite, i.e. to develop from the 
actual, given relations of life the forms in which these have been apotheosized 
(Marx 1976, p. 494). 
 
 However, this synthetic reproduction is recognised by Bonefeld as the only 
materialist and scientific method for the genetic development of perverted social 
forms, i.e. for the social constitution of fetishised forms of objectivity out of human 
relations. As far as forms of subjectivity are concerned, they might at most be 
considered part of the genetic development of forms only insofar as individuals ‘act 
rationally as executors of economic laws over which they have no control’ (Bonefeld 
2012, p. 128), which for this approach is the only aspect under which human beings 
act as personifications of economic categories. But as for antagonistic forms of 
subjectivity and action, they seem to fall outside the scope of the systematic 
unfolding of ‘economic categories’ (except, of course, as instances of negation of the 
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latter’s self-movement, i.e. as struggles against it). Thus, Bonefeld states: ‘Does it 
really make sense to say that workers personify variable capital? Variable capital 
does not go on strike. Workers do’ (Bonefeld 2010, p. 68). And they do so not as 
owners of labour power trying to secure the reproduction of their commodity. More 
importantly, the workers struggle daily against ‘the capitalist reduction of human 
purposes to cash and product’ (Bonefeld 2010, p. 72).6  
 In sum, for this kind of approach the synthetic movement of the dialectical 
exposition concerns the social constitution of ‘economic categories’ and the 
continuous process of reproduction of the constitutive premise of their existence at 
every turn of the conceptual development. Bonefeld locates this premise in the ‘logic 
of separation’ of labour from its conditions (Bonefeld 2011, p. 395), i.e. in the formal 
subsumption of labour to capital. But the systematic sequence does not entail any 
progress in the knowledge of the immanent determinations of revolutionary 
subjectivity. The significance that Bonefeld attaches to the culminating point of 
Marx’s systematic exposition in Volume I of Capital, which for him should be better 
confined to the concept of primitive accumulation, is symptomatic in this regard.7 The 
chapter on the ‘historical tendency of capitalist accumulation’ only matters insofar as 
‘it also continues the process of expropriation in its own terms, as capital 
centralization’ (Bonefeld 2011, p. 394). As for the revolutionary expropriation of the 
expropriators and the bursting asunder of the capitalist integument that Marx posits 
as the necessary outcome of the alienated socialisation of private labour, Bonefeld 
considers that they should be left aside as ‘desperately triumphal remarks’ (Bonefeld 
2011, p. 395). This should come as no surprise. As I have shown, according to his 
approach, revolutionary subjectivity is quite simply self-grounded in an abstract inner 
negativity, which is expressed, however ‘contradictorily’, in every manifestation of 
resistance to oppression. 
 At first sight, and in contradistinction to the ‘fatalism’ and ‘quietism’ entailed by 
orthodox perspectives that posit the supersession of capital in terms of the 
‘mechanic’ impossibility of its expanded reproduction (i.e. the different versions of 
theories of capitalist breakdown), Open Marxism seems to extoll and ‘empower’ the 
political action of the working class. At the same time, this conception appears to 
avoid the lapse into the naïve immediatism and subjectivism characteristic of, for 
instance, so-called ‘Autonomist Marxism’.8 However, I shall show in the next section 
that the Open Marxist perspective is also deeply problematic. 
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The limits of Open Marxism 
 
The first fundamental substantive critical remark that can be made about the 
Open Marxist approach is that despite its valuable attempt to undertake an 
uncompromising and radical criticism of capitalist social relations in their totality, it 
ends up naturalising the historically-specific social form of personal freedom 
characterising the private and independent individual, i.e. the subjectivity of the 
commodity producer. As a consequence, this perspective cannot but lead to the 
practical impotence to abolish the fetishism of the commodity- and capital-forms of 
social relations. In order to substantiate this point, let us examine the matter more 
closely.    
In effect, as Iñigo Carrera (2007, Chapter 3) forcefully argues in what I think is 
one of his most important contributions to the contemporary reconstruction of the 
Marxian critique of political economy, in capitalism free consciousness is neither the 
abstract opposite to nor the content of alienated consciousness. Instead, the 
consciousness that is free from all relations of personal subjection is but the mode in 
which the alienated consciousness of the commodity producer affirms through its 
own negation. In other words, the other side of the coin by which the human 
individual sees her/his social powers as the objective attribute of the product of 
social labour (i.e. value) is her/his self-conception as the bearer of an abstractly free, 
‘self-determining’ subjectivity. Thus, it is by seeing herself/himself – and therefore 
practically acting – as abstractly free that the individual affirms and reproduces 
her/his alienated productive practice, that is, her/his social determination as 
personification of the objectified forms of the general social relation of production 
(the commodity, money, capital and so on).9  
As Marx himself points out in the Grundrisse, the subjective form of personal 
freedom is but an expression of the fact ‘that the individual has an existence only as 
a producer of exchange value’ (Marx 1976, pp. 717–19): 
 
Therefore, when the economic form, exchange, posits the all-sided equality of 
its subjects, then the content, the individual as well as the objective material 
which drives towards the exchange, is freedom. Equality and freedom are thus 
not only respected in exchange based on exchange values but, also, the 
exchange of exchange values is the productive, real basis of all equality 
and freedom. As pure ideas they are merely the idealized expressions of this 
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basis; as developed in juridical, political, social relations, they are merely this 
basis to a higher power. And so it has been in history. Equality and freedom as 
developed to this extent are exactly the opposite of the freedom and equality in 
the world of antiquity, where developed exchange value was not their basis, 
but where, rather, the development of that basis destroyed them. Equality and 
freedom presuppose relations of production as yet unrealized in the ancient 
world and in the Middle Ages. Direct forced labour is the foundation of the 
ancient world; the community rests on this as its foundation; labour itself as a 
‘privilege’, as still particularized, not yet generally producing exchange values, 
is the basis of the world of the Middle Ages. Labour is neither forced labour; 
nor, as in the second case, does it take place with respect to a common, 
higher unit (the guild) (Marx 1993, p. 245). 
 
 Now, we have seen that despite Open Marxism’s valiant efforts to eliminate all 
exteriority between human productive practice and its alienated social forms of 
existence, when it comes to grounding the radical transformative powers of the 
working class, these authors end up reintroducing through the back door a ‘moment’ 
of subjectivity which is set into motion as an unmediated expression of the generic 
‘constitutive power’ of human labour. Revolutionary action is thus not seen as 
undertaken by wage-workers in their alienated determination as personifications of 
their reified social being (i.e. capital). Instead, Revolutionary action becomes 
represented as abstractly free and the content of that freedom as working class self-
determination. In other words, the source of the potentiality to achieve the 
revolutionary abolition of capital is seen as having no material and social 
determination other than the will of wage-workers who, through their irreducible 
refusal to subordinate their ‘human dignity’ to the ‘cash nexus’, unleash, albeit always 
in a ‘contradictory’ fashion (on which more below), the radical transformation of 
materiality of the social life-process. 
This is openly manifest already in Bonefeld’s early work (Bonefeld 1993, pp. 26-
8), precisely in the way he appears to be at pains to overcome the externality 
between labour and capital extolled by ‘Autonomist Marxists’, without relapsing into a 
structural functionalism (e.g. Jessop 1991) that reduces class struggle to a form of 
the reproduction of capital and denies its capital-transcending potentialities 
(Bonefeld 1993, pp. 26–8). Bonefeld attempts to navigate through this antinomy by 
emphatically stressing the ‘internal or dialectical relation’ between labour and capital 
as one between material content (‘the constitutive power of human practice’) and its 
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alienated mode of existence (‘social reproduction as domination’). Thus, it follows 
from this (allegedly) immanent nexus between content and form that alienation 
permeates all capitalist social existence, so that the two poles cut across every 
manifestation of class struggle (indeed, the singularity of each human subject): there 
being no privileged form of action which can be said to express the affirmation of a 
pure non-alienated subjectivity. ‘Reform’ (‘labour as a moment of social reproduction 
in the form of capital’) and ‘Revolution’ are therefore seen as constituting ‘extreme 
poles of a dialectical continuum that social practice represents’ (Bonefeld 1992, p. 
102). However, in what I think is key to the argument of this paper, Bonefeld explicitly 
characterises the revolutionary moment of ‘transcendence’ as a ‘process in and 
against capital in terms of working class self-determination’, so that the resolution of 
the ‘dialectical continuum’ between ‘Reform’ and ‘Revolution’ is not determined but is 
‘open to the process of struggle itself’ (ibid., my emphasis). In other words, this 
discussion makes evident that Open Marxists consider that the moment of 
‘transcendence’ (i.e. revolutionary subjectivity), even if always intertwined with 
‘integration’ (the determination of the wage worker’s alienated subjectivity as 
personification of the reproduction of capital), ultimately is the expression of working-
class self-determination, that is, as an element of subjectivity that is not a mode of 
existence of (hence determined by) the capital form. The specifically revolutionary 
resolution of the class struggle is thereby seen as an unmediated assertion of this 
undetermined, residual and pristine human content lurking behind the fetishised 
social forms of capitalist society. 
This leads us to a further weakness of the Open Marxist approach, which is of 
a more methodological dimension. Specifically, I think that despite the recurring 
insistence on ‘internal or dialectical’ relations, this perspective actually entails an 
external representation of the immanent nexus between the content and concrete 
form of revolutionary subjectivity in terms of a ‘pseudo-dialectic’ consisting in the 
‘unity of opposites’. This becomes apparent in its treatment of the notion of 
contradiction, which is usually initially postulated correctly (at least formally) as the 
self-negating form of existence of a determinate content (hence as the self-
movement of affirmation through negation), but which then surreptitiously turns, in 
the very course of the same argument, in the ‘intertwining’ of two different immediate 
affirmations, extrinsically united in a process of ‘struggle between antagonistic 
opposites’ (Iñigo Carrera 2013, Chapter 1; Starosta 2015, Chapter 3). Although this 
should be already clear from Bonefeld’s passages discussed above, it is thrown into 
even sharper relief in the work of Richard Gunn, who offers the most rigorous and in-
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depth methodological discussion within the Open Marxist tradition. Interestingly and 
relevantly for the theme of this section, in what is a foundational article from this 
perspective, Gunn poses the question in terms of the contradictory relationship 
between freedom and alienation in capitalist society. 
Gunn’s point of departure is in itself already problematic, insofar as he overtly 
postulates ‘freedom qua self-determination’ as a general, hence transhistorical, 
feature of the human species being, this being what distinguishes the latter from 
other natural forms of the material world (Gunn 1992, p. 28). But what is actually of 
interest here is the way in which he confronts the question of alienation in capitalism 
and its revolutionary overcoming, which is posed by Gunn as involving the following 
paradox:  
 
If we move freely then we were not unfree to begin with, but if we move 
unfreely then freedom (at any rate in the sense of self-determination) can 
never be the result (ibid., p. 29).   
   
The ‘trick’, Gunn continues, ‘has to be to see unfreedom as a mode of 
existence of freedom’ (ibid.). In this sense, he concludes that in reality there is no 
such thing as unfreedom, but ‘unfree freedom, freedom subsisting alienatedly, i.e. in 
the mode of being denied’ (ibid.). In brief, and leaving aside for the moment the 
inverted form in which he represents the nexus between ‘freedom qua self-
determination’ and alienation in capitalism, it is clear that so far his argument 
revolves around the self-negating affirmation of a determinate content in its concrete 
form of realisation, that is, the movement of contradiction. 
How, according to Gunn, does this contradiction between the essential 
content of freedom of human subjectivity and its alienated mode of existence 
develop into the form of a revolutionary action that puts alienation to an end? In 
order to examine this question, let us now turn our attention to a more recent article 
(co-authored with Adrian Wilding) in which, in the context of a sympathetic critical 
assessment of John Hollow’s book Crack Capitalism (Holloway 2010), the two 
authors revisit and elaborate further this question (Gunn and Wilding 2012; see also 
Gunn and Wilding 2014). The terms of the problem remain the same, albeit now 
approached from a slightly different angle: the apparent antinomy that they track 
down in Holloway’s book between what they call the ‘attractive’ view of revolution, 
according to which freedom already exists in a pristine and undistorted form in a pre-
revolutionary situation (thus making the revolutionary task clearly possible but all too 
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simple and voluntarist), and the ‘unattractive’ view, which assumes that freedom is 
literally absent in a pre-revolutionary situation (which sounds more ‘realistic’ but, 
according to these authors, makes it impossible for freedom to be the result of 
revolution) (Gunn and Wilding, pp. 178-80). The solution to this antinomy is, in line 
with Gunn’s argument reviewed above, to acknowledge both that revolution 
effectively is an act which ends voluntary servitude and therefore ‘is an expression 
and articulation of already-free action’ (Gunn y Wilding 2012, p. 178) and that in a pre-
revolutionary social world, such freedom exists but in a ‘distorted’ or ‘self-
contradictory and alienated’ form (Gunn y Wilding 2012, pp. 181–2). Thus, the 
question is seen as involving a transition from a situation in which freedom already 
obtains but in an alienated form (pre-revolutionary situation), to a situation in which 
freedom exists in an uncontradicted and non-alienated from (revolution) (Gunn y 
Wilding 2012, p. 182). In other words, for Gunn and Wilding, mediation only pertains 
to capital-reproducing ‘moments’ of subjectivity, but not to the revolutionary ‘pole of 
the continuum’, which is seen as an affirmation of the human being’s innately free 
self-determining subjectivity that ‘breaks through’ its alienated ‘integument’. 
This shows very clearly in the way they conceptualise ‘uncontradicted self-
determination’, in a twofold sense. In the first place, when they claim that in a 
generally non-revolutionary situation, such an uncontradicted self-determination 
already makes its appearance within an alienated society, albeit in a ‘proleptic or 
prefigurative’ fashion, in and through ‘islands of mutual recognition’ in the ‘cracks and 
fissures’ of a contradictory social world (Gunn and Wilding 2014). Out of the blue, 
human life is now turned into the unity of two intertwining opposites: an alienated 
pole for the greater part of social existence and a free one in those ‘islands of mutual 
recognition’. In the second place, it is noteworthy how they construct their concept of 
freedom on the basis of Hegel’s concept of recognition as played out in the Master-
Slave dialectic from Chapter IV of his Phenomenology of Spirit and further developed 
historically in Chapter VI, which culminates with the discussion of patterns of 
recognition in the French Revolution. In other words, they construct the ground of the 
communist revolution based on a conceptual framework whose actual content is but 
the emergence and concrete development of the modern, capitalistic ‘self-
determining’ freedom of the commodity owner out of relations of personal 
dependence, which is ideologically presented by Hegel in an inverted fashion as the 
movement of an abstract individual self-consciousness deprived of social 
determinations.10 As a consequence of all this, their critique of Holloway’s occasional 
appeal to a ‘pristine’ or ‘undistorted’ freedom is thus limited to noting that ‘such an 
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immediacy that lies outside alienation’s realm’ cannot be taken ‘as starting point’ for 
the search for the genesis of revolutionary subjectivity within a non-revolutionary 
situation (Gunn and Wilding 2012, p. 184), yet it does constitute the ‘key’ to (i.e. the 
content of) its interstitial emergence and eventual proliferation. Hence, despite their 
best efforts, Open Marxists end up sneaking an abstractly free subjectivity through 
the backdoor as the ground for the revolutionary transformation of society. In the 
end, the difference from the Autonomists comes down to a more sober and cautious 
subjective attitude when assessing ‘really-existing’ working-class struggles. Against 
the ‘euphoric and triumphalist poetry that prevails in various Autonomia-influenced 
accounts’, Gunn and Wilding’s Open Marxist perspective ‘allows for respect for a 
reality principle (in Freud’s sense)’ (2012, p. 182), a ‘word of warning’ about the 
‘difficulties’ and ‘complexities’ involved in revolution. But the ground of revolutionary 
subjectivity in an abstractly free and self-determined subject remains the same.         
Now, from where does this notion of free (qua self-determining) subjectivity by 
nature, which constitutes for these Marxist authors the content of revolutionary 
action, arise? Certainly not from the imagination of the theorist. When looked at more 
closely, we can realise that it is in fact the concrete form of the alienated 
consciousness abstracted from its content and transformed into its ‘logical’ opposite. 
It is from that apparent exteriority that free subjectivity is posited as the source of the 
revolutionary negation of alienated subjectivity. Emancipation is positioned as the 
removal of the inevitable external coercion imposed by social objectivity upon the 
natural self-determination of apparently free consciousness. In other words, that 
reading aspires to get rid of the commodity, money, capital and the state precisely on 
the basis of the immediate affirmation of the concrete form of the most general 
subjective form of existence of alienated human practice which is the necessary 
complement of those forms of objectivity, namely: the personal freedom of 
personifications of commodities.11 Which is, quite simply, an oxymoron. In sum, the 
connection between science as critique and the abolition of the fetishism of capitalist 
social relations needs to be approached differently. In the next section, we propose 
and develop such an alternative perspective.   
           
Commodity fetishism and science as practical critique 
  
 As anticipated in the introduction, I think that a fruitful alternative perspective 
can be found in the substantive and methodological contributions of Iñigo Carrera to 
the critique of political economy. According to this reading, the question of science 
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as critique must be approached in a radically different manner. More concretely, it is 
about a development of the dialectical method which, insofar as it recognises 
knowledge’s own immanent material determination as the organisational ‘moment’ 
of human action, gives science the specific form of practical critique. In this sense, 
the proper starting point and immediate object of the dialectical critique of political 
economy is the question about the conscious organisation of the radical 
transformative action which aims at revolutionising the forms of social life. This 
means that it is not just a question of the centrality of class struggle as the 
fundamental ‘substantive abstraction’ that constitutes the object of an abstractly 
theoretical process of cognition, which therefore renders it inevitably external to 
practice, despite rhetorical claims to the contrary in the name of the ‘immanence of 
theory within its object’ (Gunn 1992; Bonefeld 1992, 1995). Instead, it is a matter of the 
scientific inquiry into the conscious self-organisation of one’s own transformative 
action in its singularity, albeit acknowledged as an individual organic moment of 
such radical collective action. To put it differently, at stake in radically critical 
scientific cognition is the objective knowledge of the social determinations, the 
immanent necessity, of our own individual action beyond any appearance (Iñigo 
Carrera 1992, p.1). Only on this basis is it possible to attain the voluntary revolutionary 
transformation of the social world.  
From the standpoint of the scientific-critical method which is necessary for the 
immanent discovery of revolutionary subjectivity, both the Neue Marx-Lektüre and 
the Open Marxist approach conceive of the ‘defetishising’ moment of the critique of 
political economy as limited to the analytical movement of ‘reductio ad hominem’ by 
which cognition traces the human origins of objectified forms of capitalist social 
mediation.  However, at least with regards to knowledge of the grounds of 
revolutionary subjectivity, the properly critical moment of dialectical research is 
exhausted in the exposition of the most simple and general expression of capitalist 
alienation, that is, in the ‘fetishism of commodities’. By contrast, my own alternative 
perspective on Marx’s dialectical investigation of the determinations of the 
commodity form (commodity fetishism included) leads to a different conclusion 
regarding the connection between revolutionary praxis and these simpler fetishised 
forms of the general social relation of production which mediate the unity of social 
life. 
True enough, in this process of cognition we become aware of the human 
content of the objective social powers borne by the commodity. However, what 
follows from this insight is not that we therefore immediately carry the power to 
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negate the commodity form of our general social relation. Rather, it follows that 
whatever power we might have to radically transform the world must be a concrete 
form of the commodity itself. Yet, far from revealing the existence of that 
transformative power, the abstract determinations of social existence contained in 
the commodity form show no potentiality other than the reproduction of that 
alienated social form. So much so that the free association of individuals (the 
determinate negation of capitalism) appears in Chapter 1 (incidentally, precisely in 
the section on fetishism) as the abstract opposite of value-producing labour and 
hence, as the extrinsic product of the imagination of the subject engaged in that 
process of cognition. Thus, Marx starts that passage referring to communism by 
saying ‘let us finally imagine …’ (Marx 1976, p. 171, my emphasis). 
Thus, the defetishising critique of revolutionary science does not simply 
consist in discovering the constituting power of a generic human practice as the 
negated content of capitalist alienated forms, which would constitute the ground for 
our revolutionary transformation of the world. Rather, it involves the production of the 
self-awareness that the reproduction of human life in all of its moments, including 
our transformative action, takes an alienated form in capitalism. The immediate 
result of the demystifying critique of the fetishism of commodities is to become 
conscious of our own alienated existence, i.e. of our determination as 
personifications or ‘character masks’. This is our general social being and there is no 
exteriority to it. Fetishism is total which, in turn, means the social powers of our 
transformative action are effectively borne by the product of labour and we cannot 
but personify them. 
This obviously bears on the question discussed earlier on the relationship 
between alienation and freedom. Specifically, this means that upon consciously 
discovering the social basis of the value form, we do not cease to be determined as 
its personifications and become able to affirm an abstractly free self-determining 
action. What this discovery changes is, as Iñigo Carrea puts it, that our social 
determination as personification of the commodity no longer operates behind our 
backs (Iñigo Carrera 2007, p. 204). In this way, we do affirm our freedom. However, 
we do so not because we realise that ‘in reality’ we are free beings by nature and 
could thereby ‘choose’ to ‘stop making capitalism’ if we tried hard enough, i.e. if we 
turned our backs on our social being (Cf. Holloway 2010). Instead, through the critical 
investigation of the value form we affirm our freedom because we come consciously 
to cognise our own determination as alienated social subjects (Iñigo Carrera 2007, p. 
204). Armed with that objective knowledge of the alienated nature of our subjectivity, 
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we could consciously act upon those alienated determinations in order to transform 
them in the direction of their revolutionary transcendence. Still, this would only be 
possible if those determinations actually carried the objective potentiality for their 
self-abolition, which is something that the simple commodity form of social relations 
does not show. This does not mean that commodity fetishism cannot be abolished. It 
only signals the need to move forward in the dialectical investigation of the more 
concrete social determinations of its revolutionary abolition. 
Perhaps a good way to clarify this argument is by examining a methodological 
external remark that Marx introduces when discussing the function of money as 
means of payment in the 1859 Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. It is 
worth quoting that profoundly rich text at length:  
 
But the metamorphosis of commodities, in the course of which the various 
distinct forms of money are evolved, transforms the commodity-owners as 
well, and alters the social role they play in relation to one another. In the 
course of the metamorphosis of commodities the keeper of commodities 
changes his skin as often as the commodity undergoes a change or as money 
appears in a new form. Commodity-owners thus faced each other originally 
simply as commodity-owners; then one of them became a seller, the other a 
buyer; then each became alternately buyer and seller; then they became 
hoarders and finally rich men. Commodity-owners emerging from the process 
of circulation are accordingly different from those entering the process. The 
different forms which money assumes in the process of circulation are in fact 
only crystallisations of the transformation of commodities, a transformation 
which is in its turn only the objective expression of the changing social 
relations in which commodity-owners conduct their exchange. New relations 
of intercourse arise in the process of circulation, and commodity-owners, who 
represent these changed relations, acquire new economic characteristics 
(Marx 1987, p. 371). 
 
 This passage could be read as a kind of dynamic development of the 
alienated determination of human productive individuality, whose simplest 
expression Marx presented through the discussion of the fetishism of commodities. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Starosta 2015, Chapter 5), in the latter text Marx unfolds 
the way in which the productive consciousness of the private individual 
unconsciously posits its own immanent determinations in the external form of the 
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value-objectivity. Subsequently, he shows how the very subjectivity of the commodity 
producer becomes determined as the personification of those objectified forms of 
social mediation it had unconsciously engendered. What we have here is a 
statement of the transformative dynamics structuring the constitution of novel forms 
of subjectivity as an expression of the further concretisation of the ‘law of value’ 
beyond its simplest form. It is, as it were, the ‘law of private subjectivity’ that regulates 
the development of further concrete forms in which human beings act as 
‘personifications of economic categories’. 
Certainly, those more complex forms in which the movement of value attains 
unity remain ‘only the objective expression of the changing social relations in which 
commodity owners conduct their exchange’, i.e. their simplest (social) content 
remains the general productive relation between human beings. However, the real 
inversion of those social relations as attributes of things means that human beings 
cannot consciously control the self-transformation of their subjectivity (at least not 
with the determinations unfolded up to that point). This transformation thereby 
occurs ‘behind their back’ as a result of the self-movement of the alienated forms of 
objectivity through which their social metabolic process takes place. As those 
objectified forms self-develop and change, commodity owners ‘who represent these 
changed relations, acquire new economic characteristics’, i.e. they progressively 
emerge from the circulation process wearing different ‘character masks’ from those 
with which they entered.  
In the passage above, Marx specifies the forms of subjectivity that have 
emerged up to that particular stage of his presentation. More concretely, he 
mentions the figure of simple commodity owner, buyer and seller, hoarder and rich 
man. However, the implication of this discussion is that commodity owners shall 
undergo further ‘changes of skin’. Thus, a few pages later he develops the figure of 
debtor and creditor (Marx 1987, p. 373), noting also how the corresponding general 
ideological forms change as well. From religion as the ideological form 
corresponding to the hoarder, we now move to jurisprudence as the one 
corresponding to the subjective form of creditor (ibid.). Furthermore, ‘as money 
develops into world money, so the commodity owner becomes a cosmopolitan’, the 
general ideological form of which is that of ‘cosmopolitanism, a cult of practical 
reason, in opposition to traditional religious, national and other prejudices which 
impede the metabolic process of mankind’ (Marx 1987, p. 384). 
The fundamental point of this discussion is that those passages from the 1859 
Contribution bring out very nicely a fundamental aspect of Marx’s ‘systematic 
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dialectic’: it includes both the forms of objectivity and subjectivity of capitalist society. 
But additionally, they implicitly contain important methodological insights into the 
way in which the genesis of different forms of subjectivity should be materialistically 
investigated, namely, as necessary mediations of the autonomised self-movement of 
forms of objectivity. This, I think, is the only method which allows us immanently to 
ground forms of consciousness and will (i.e. subjectivity) within the movement of 
present-day social relations. Crucially, my central claim is that if we want to stay true 
to this materialistic approach, this method should not only ‘apply’ to ‘value-
reproducing’ forms of subjectivity and action, but must also include revolutionary 
subjectivity as well. In other words, the form of ‘revolutionary political subject’ (more 
specifically, of our own subjectivity as an individual organ of such a collective class 
subject) must be immanently unfolded as a much more developed mode of 
existence taken by the original commodity owner with which the dialectical 
exposition started. 
 To put it in more general terms, the immanent ground of revolutionary 
subjectivity is not simple and unmediated. Instead, it is a ‘unity of many 
determinations’, which therefore means that its scientific comprehension can only be 
the result of a complex dialectical investigation involving both the analytic movement 
from the concrete to the abstract, and the synthetic, mediated return to the concrete 
starting point, i.e. revolutionary transformative action. Dialectical research must 
therefore analytically apprehend all relevant social forms and synthetically reproduce 
the ‘inner connections’ leading to the constitution of the political action of wage 
labourers as the form taken by the revolutionary transformation of the historical 
mode of existence of the human life process. 
Now, if the ‘reproduction of the concrete in thought’ shows that the 
determinations immanent in the commodity form do not carry, in their simplicity, the 
necessity of transcending value-production, the search for the latter must move 
forward unfolding the subsequent concrete forms in which the former develop. Our 
process of cognition still needs to go through more mediations in order to become 
fully aware of the necessity of our action in the totality of its determinations, i.e. 
beyond any appearance presented by it. In order to develop the plenitude of its 
potentiality, this conscious development must reach a concrete form of our alienated 
social being which embodies a determinate potentiality whose realisation: (a) entails 
the abolition of alienated labour itself; and (b) has our transformative action as its 
necessary concrete form. In sum, revolutionary action must personify a concrete 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 





determination of value-producing human practice; a determination, however, whose 
realisation precisely consists in the abolition of value production itself. 
In this sense, far from exhausting science’s ‘critical-practical moment’, the ideal 
reproduction of the commodity form and its fetish-character (in the unity of its 
analytic and synthetic phases) is thereby but the first step in the broader process of 
dialectical cognition through which the subject of revolutionary transformation 
discovers the alienated character of her/his social being and, consequently, of 
her/his consciousness and will (including her/his transformative will). However, this 
process also produces the awareness of the historical powers developed in this 
alienated form and, consequently, of the revolutionary action that, as sheer 
personification of ‘economic categories’, the emancipatory subject needs to 
undertake (Iñigo Carrera 2013). Such development of those subsequent 
determinations whose unity underlies the constitution of the working class as 
revolutionary subject obviously exceeds the scope of this paper. However, by way of 
conclusion, in the final section I sketch out the essential moments of the systematic-
dialectical unfolding of the movement of the capital form whose historical tendency 
leads to the necessity of its self-abolition in the concrete form of the radical 
transformative action of the proletariat.12 
 
Concluding remarks: from the commodity to the revolutionary subject 
 
I pointed out earlier that, from a materialist perspective, the necessity 
underlying the social constitution of the revolutionary subject should immanently 
derive from the unfolding of the potentialities of the commodity producer from which 
the dialectical exposition started, which make the latter undergo a ‘change of skin’. 
However, the transformations at stake are not exhausted with those commodity 
producers’s experience as a result of the subsequent determinations of the general 
circulation of commodities as such. In fact, the very development of the full 
potentialities of the general commodity circulation process shows that their 
realisation involves their self-transcendence into an internal moment of the 
circulation of capital (Marx 1976, pp. 247–50). In becoming capital, value – the 
materialised social relation of the private and independent individuals – turns into the 
concrete subject of the process of circulation of social wealth. In turn, the commodity 
and money, the particular and the general mode of existence of mercantile wealth, 
become determined as transitory forms which value-as-capital takes in its process of 
self-expansion (Marx 1976, p. 255). The alienation of the human individual thus 
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reaches a new stage. It is not only about a process of social production mediated by 
the value form of the product.  Nor is it even about one that simply has value as the 
direct object of the exchange process. The objectified abstract labour represented as 
the exchangeability of commodities has taken possession of the potencies of the 
process of circulation of social wealth itself. This moment of the human life process 
is turned into an attribute of the life cycle of capital, which has the production of more 
of itself, i.e. its quantitative increase or the production of surplus value, as its only 
general qualitative determination. 
Now, although having circulation as its point of departure and hence with this 
sphere as one of its moments, the process of value’s self-expansion pushes beyond 
circulation itself. The movement of capital shows the necessity to find within the 
circulation of commodities a commodity whose use value for capital is to produce 
more value than it costs. The existence of the doubly free worker provides capital 
with this requirement (Marx 1976, p. 270). As an independent human being, this 
worker can freely dispose of her/his individual productive powers (Marx 1976, p. 271). 
However, insofar as she/he is deprived of the objective conditions in which to 
externalise her/his personally-free subjectivity, she/he must give her/his labour 
power the form of a commodity to be sold on the market to the immediate 
personification of capital (Marx 1976, p. 272). As stated above, it is through the 
appropriation of the use value of this peculiar commodity that capital is able to 
valorise itself. The exposition must therefore develop the determinations of the 
process of consumption of labour power, which takes place ‘outside the market’ 
(Marx 1976, p. 279). In this way, Marx’s presentation demonstrates how capital not 
only becomes the subject of the process of circulation of social wealth, but also turns 
into the formal subject of the labour process, which it subsumes as the material 
bearer of its self-valorisation. And this means that the production of use values, 
hence of human life, has ceased to be the immediate content of the movement of 
social reproduction and has become the unconscious or ‘blind’ outcome of the 
production of surplus value, that is, of the alienated content presiding over the 
movement of modern society. This is where the formal specificity of capital as an 
indirect, hence fetishised, general social relation resides. From this point onwards, 
the dialectical exposition will show that individuals, precisely for being the material 
subjects of this process (rather than ‘in spite of’), shall become fully form-determined 
as personifications of different determinations emerging out of the movement of 
value’s self-valorisation. 
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Thus, with the development of the content of the general social relation into 
the process of capital’s self-valorisation, commodity owners who ‘who represent 
these changed relations, acquire new economic characteristics’. In the first place, 
they become differentiated, respectively, into personifications of money-as-capital 
(the capitalist) and the commodity labour power (the wage-worker). Secondly, given 
the peculiarity of this latter commodity, the antagonism immanent in the purchase of 
labour power transcends the circulation process and carries over into the conditions 
of appropriation of its use value in the direct process of production, i.e. into the 
determination of the normal duration of the working day (Marx, 1976, pp. 342-3). 
Furthermore, this analysis shows that the realisation of the full value of labour-power, 
and therefore its long-term reproduction in the very conditions that capital in general 
(as opposed to the individual capital) demands from the wage worker as the only 
source of surplus value, is not independent from the determination of the extensive 
magnitude of its productive consumption (Marx 1976, p. 343).  The purchase of the 
commodity labour power can thereby only be resolved by making the antagonistic 
relationship between its buyer and seller transcend its merely individual character in 
order to take the concrete form of class struggle (Marx 1976, pp. 344ff). The latter 
thus becomes determined as the most general direct social relation between 
collective personifications of commodities which mediates the establishment of the 
unity of the essentially indirect relations of capitalist production ruled by the 
valorisation of capital. In other words, though clearly an ‘endemic’ reality of the 
capitalist mode of production, the class struggle is not ‘ontologically’ but socially 
constitutive of capitalism, since capitalists and wage-workers, as owners of 
commodities (not as embodiments of ontologically different principles of social 
reproduction), personify social determinations of the process of valorisation of capital 
whose realisation is antagonistic. More generally, this implies that the determinations 
implicated in the mere existence of labour power as commodity, or the merely formal 
subsumption of labour to capital, do not give the class struggle the transformative 
potentiality to go beyond the capitalist mode of production. In this simple 
determination, the political action of the working class only exists as a necessary 
concrete form of the reproduction of capitalist social relations and not of its 
revolutionary overcoming.13 
As a matter of fact, the unfolding of the sequence of form determinations 
shows that the socio-historical genesis of the emancipatory subject can actually be 
found in the transformations in the materiality of social life brought about by the real 
subsumption of humanity to capital; more specifically, in the concrete form of large-
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scale industry which constitutes capital’s most developed method of production of 
relative surplus value. In effect, as Marx shows in Capital and the Grundrisse, through 
the constant revolution in the material conditions of social labour, capital transforms, 
contradictorily but progressively, the productive subjectivity of wage workers 
according to a determinate tendency: they eventually become universal labourers, 
that is, organs of a directly collective productive body capable of self-consciously 
ruling their individual participation in the social metabolic process by virtue of their 
power scientifically to organise the production process of any system of machinery 
and, therefore, any form of social co-operation.14 In other words, the alienated social 
necessity arises for each individual member of the collective labourer to be 
produced as a subject that is fully and objectively aware of the social determinations 
of her/his individual powers and activity and who therefore consciously recognises 
the social necessity of the expenditure of her/his labour power in organic association 
with the other producers. However, this form of productive subjectivity necessarily 
collides with a social form (capital) that produces human beings as private and 
independent individuals who consequently see their general social interdependence 
and its historical development as an alien and hostile power borne by the product of 
social labour. The determination of the material forms of the labour process as 
bearers of objectified social relations can no longer mediate the reproduction of 
human life. Capital accumulation must therefore come to an end and give way to the 
free association of individuals. This is the inner material content of social life which is 
expressed in the form of the political revolutionary subjectivity of workers. 
 In sum, it is the historically-determined necessity for the all-sided and directly 
social development of the universality of productive attributes of workers beyond its 
capitalist ‘integument’ – though generated by the alienated movement of capital itself 
– that is realised in the concrete form of the communist revolution. And this means 
that the revolutionary political consciousness of the working class can only be a 
concrete mode of existence of their productive consciousness. In other words, what 
the revolutionary movement realises (its content) is, fundamentally, the 
transformation of the materiality of the productive forces of the human individual and, 
therefore, of their social forms of organisation and development. It is about a material 
mutation of the production process of human life, which takes concrete shape 
through a social transformation, which, in turn, expresses itself through a political 
action. 
 On the other hand, this also means that revolutionary powers are not ‘self-
developed’ by the workers, but are an alienated attribute that capital puts into their 
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own hands through the transformations of their productive subjectivity produced by 
the alienated socialisation and universalisation of labour through which the 
production of relative surplus value takes place. This is the reason why revolutionary 
consciousness is itself a concrete form of the alienation of human powers as 
capital’s powers. The abolition of capital is not an abstractly free, self-determining 
political action, but one that the workers are compelled to undertake as 
personifications of the alienated laws of movement of capital itself. When the 
workers consciously organise the revolutionary abolition of the capitalist mode of 
production, they do so not as the incarnation of the powers of an abstract human 
practice deprived of social determinations, but as ‘character masks’ or 
‘representatives’ of the inverted existence of the powers of their social labour, i.e. 
capital. The point is that it is an alienated action that in the course of its own 
development liberates itself from all trace of its alienated existence. Paraphrasing the 
above-quoted passage from the 1859 Contribution, individuals ‘emerging from the 
reproduction process are accordingly different from those entering it’. They enter it as 
wage workers personifying capital’s need to produce relative surplus value. Yet, in 
the course of the revolutionary action they undertake as such personifications, they 
‘change skin’ and emerge as consciously (thus freely) associated fully developed 
social individuals. In this sense, what sets capital-transcending political action apart 
from capital-reproducing forms of the class-struggle is its specific determination as a 
political action that is fully conscious of its own alienated nature, i.e. of personifying a 
necessity of capital. However, by becoming conscious of their determination as a 
mode of existence of capital, revolutionary workers also discover the historic task 
that as fully conscious yet alienated individuals they have to undertake: the 
supersession of capital through the production of the communist organisation of 
social life. 
 Finally, let us briefly draw the main implications of all this for one of the central 
methodological issues on which this paper has focused, namely, the determination 
of science as critique. In a nutshell, this discussion suggests that the content and 
product of the process of cognition entailed by the critique of political economy is 
therefore not the awareness of the external circumstances of a self-determining 
action. Instead, it is the self-awareness of the inner material and social 
determinations of our own alienated transformative action. Thus, dialectical social 
science does not look outside our action in order to comprehend the ‘objective 
conditions’ that ‘constrain’ its abstractly free affirmation, but rather, in penetrating its 
immediate appearances (including that of being abstractly free), goes right ‘inside’ it. 
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In this way, the field of human practice is never abandoned. Moreover, only by virtue 
of its dialectical form, involving both its analytic and synthetic moments, does the 
critique of political economy become determined as the fully conscious organisation 
of human practice in the capitalist mode of production and, hence, as the 
revolutionary science of the working class (Iñigo Carrera 2007, pp. 7-8). 
 
1 For a concise historical and intellectual contextualisation of the Neue Marx-Lektüre in English, see 
Endnotes 2010 and Bellofiore and Riva 2015. 
2 It goes without saying that the treatment of the question of revolution as ‘outside their field of 
expertise’ by scholars whose research programme revolves around the Marxian notion of critique 
seems quite odd, to say the least. The real reason seems to reside at a deeper level and is actually 
political. As Endnotes 2 further remark: ‘Most accounts of the Neue Marx-Lektüre understand as one of 
its main characteristics to be a rejection of Marx’s attribution of an historical mission to the proletariat 
and a sensibility of scepticism towards the class struggle has been prevalent on the German Left’ 
(2010, p. 98). Moreover, although seldom discussed explicitly by these scholars, there are certain 
passages in their work which give the impression that they would tend to locate the source of 
revolutionary subjectivity in a moment of human individuality which transcends its alienated existence 
as ‘character mask’: ‘Marx presents the humans themselves only insofar as they have intercourse with 
one another as character masks. Insofar as they come into relation with one another as individuals, 
they are not the object of the theory. Insofar as they act as individuals, they withdraw from the building 
of theory in this specific sense; there they anticipate something which still has to be constructed’ 
(Reichelt 1982, p. 168). If my reading is correct, rather than simply residing ‘outside their field of 
expertise’, for these scholars revolutionary subjectivity would lie outside the scope of the dialectical 
presentation of ‘economic categories’.  
3 For an earlier assessment of the relation between value-form theory, systematic dialectics and 
revolutionary politics, see also the discussion provided by Eldred 1981. 
4 In more concrete terms, Bonefeld puts it as follows: ‘For example, the conceptuality of the wage-
labourer as a personification of variable capital entails what it denies. It denies sensuous practice, and 
this practice is immanent in the concept wage-labour. Sensuous practice exists within the concept of 
variable capital in the mode of being denied – sensuous practice cannot be reduced to the concept of 
variable capital – it subsists within its concept but cannot be reduced to it. Further, for variable capital 
to function, it requires the ingenuity and spontaneity of human purposeful practice. Yet, this too is 
denied in its concept’ (2012, p. 130). The revolutionary class struggle is seen by Bonefeld as an 
expression of that sensuous human practice that ‘variable capital’ denies. In actual fact, his point 
seems to be that all struggles by workers express something more than their social determination as 
personifications of ‘variable capital’, namely, their ‘human social autonomy’ and ‘freedom’. That is why 
they can always potentially develop, in and of themselves (i.e. not as expressions of any concrete 
social determination), into communist struggles. See: Bonefeld 2010a, pp. 68–72. 
5 Taking at face value the orthodox Marxist mechanistic (hence extrinsic) notion of determination of 
subjectivity for the only available one, Bonefeld can only see in the idea of historical necessity an 
accommodating and passive attitude towards the alienated laws of motion of capital. It can never be 
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the point of departure for the conscious organisation of its practical abolition: ‘The future that will 
come will not result from some objective laws of historical development but will result from the 
struggles of today. The orthodox argument about the objective laws of historical development does 
not reveal abstract historical laws. It reveals accommodation to “objective conditions”, and derives 
socialism from capitalism, not as an alternative but as its supposedly more effective competitor. There 
is no universal historical law that leads humankind from some imagined historical beginning via 
capitalism to socialism. Neither is history on the side of the working class. History takes no sides: it 
can as easily be the history of barbarism as of socialism’ (Bonefeld 2010a, pp. 63–4). 
6 Strictly speaking, workers do not go on strike as ‘variable capital’, but as owners of the commodity 
labour power. Be that as it may, the point is that they do it in full accordance with their alienated social 
being as ‘executors of economic laws that they cannot control’ and not in ‘defiance’ of them.  
7 It is also symptomatic that in his otherwise rigorous, stylised reconstruction of the systematic 
sequence of Marx’s exposition in Capital, Volume I, the concrete forms of production of relative surplus 
value are absent (Bonefeld 2011b, pp. 392–5). As we shall see later on, it is precisely in those chapters 
on the real subsumption of labour to capital that Marx unfolds (albeit incompletely) the determinations 
of revolutionary subjectivity.  
8 Perhaps the most paradigmatic expression of the grounding of revolutionary action in a pure 
‘autonomous creativity’ of the subject within Marxism can be found in the Autonomist’s ‘inversion of 
class perspective’ centred on the concept of working-class ‘self-valorisation’, which designates the 
self-determined positive power to constitute new practices outside capitalist social forms (Cleaver 
1992, pp. 128ff; De Angelis 2007, pp. 225ff). Furthermore, this pure affirmation of the working class as 
autonomous subject is considered as (onto)logically prior to its ‘co-option’ or ‘repression’ by capital, 
deliberately represented, in line with post-structuralist thinking, as an external and self-constituting 
‘disciplinary’ power (Hardt 1993). Thus, according to De Angelis, the theoretical starting point for the 
understanding of revolutionary subjectivity must be the self-sustaining affirmation of the multiplicity of 
needs, aspirations, affects and relations of human subjects (De Angelis 2005). 
9 Note in this regard that from a materialist standpoint the meaning, content and scope of freedom can 
only derive from its role in the organisation and development of human productive subjectivity. It 
follows that complete freedom does not consist in the absence of all social determination (hence 
necessity) in the affirmation of human individuality (with alienation thereby conceived of as the 
external imposition of social relations of objective compulsion that would ‘constrain’ an otherwise 
naturally and absolutely self-determining subjectivity). Instead, fully-developed freedom consists in the 
self-conscious control by each human being over the twofold immanent character (individual and 
social) of her/his productive action, that is, over her/his individual participation in the inherently social 
process of human metabolism. Thus considered, the simplest material determination of the personal 
freedom of the private and independent producer consists in the full conscious control of the 
individual character of human productive action at the expense of all conscious control over its 
immanent general social character (Iñigo Carrera 2007, pp. 51ff.). In this sense, the overcoming of the 
fetishism of capitalist social relations entails the progressive transformation of the very historical and 
social form of human freedom, whose material content or substance thereby involves the ‘aufheben’ 
of the personal freedom of the private and independent producer. In other words, while preserving the 
full conscious control over the individual determinations of human labour, each working subject must 
also be materially-equipped with the full conscious knowledge of the social determinations of her/his 
individual labour. Only under these circumstances, ‘expending their many different forms of labour-
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power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force’, and hence rationally recognising the 
necessity to affirm their own subjectivity as individual organs of a directly collective productive body, 
can the human life process eventually take the historical form of an ‘association of free men [Mensch]’, 
which consequently overcomes the fetish-character of the commodity as the general objectified form 
of social mediation (Marx 1976, p. 171).  
10 In this context, it comes as no surprise that Gunn and Wilding also draw inspiration from La Boétie’s 
Discourse on Voluntary Servitude, an author from the mid-sixteenth century who is evidently 
confronting the question of the dissolution of direct relations of authority and subjection between 
human beings in the face of the expansion (probably unstoppable by that stage) of the commodity as 
the general indirect form of social mediation. Indeed, the voluntary servitude which the Discourse 
discusses and aspires to put an end to is that which is subject to the personal power of the ‘tyrant’. In 
other words, the Discourse is but a very early ideological expression of the historical emergence of the 
personal freedom of the personifications of commodities (whereas Hegel’s Phenomenology is a later 
expression of its consolidation and generalisation).    
11 Some authors do develop and subject to criticism the notion of bourgeois individuality. But the latter 
is reduced to individualism, that is, to the atomistic affirmation of that abstractly free subjectivity. 
Hence, the collective, solidaristic affirmation of that very same subjectivity in the form of class struggle 
is seen as the absolute opposite of alienated subjectivity (or, at least, as embodying the immediate 
potentiality to ‘self-develop’ into such an absolute negation of bourgeois individuality). See, for 
instance, Shortall’s derivation of a ‘counter-dialectic of class struggle’ – i.e. ‘the potential class 
subjectivity of the working class’ – that ‘comes to delimit the functioning of the dialectic of capital’, and 
whose foundation resides in the presupposition of the worker ‘as both a free subject and as non-
capital’ (Shortall 1994, pp. 128–9, original emphasis). By contrast, as I have shown elsewhere, the 
solidaristic collective affirmation of that abstractly free subjectivity is but a more concrete realisation of 
the very same alienated content, hence, of the reproduction of capital (Starosta 2015, Chapter 7). 
12 For a more in-depth and extensive examination of these issues, see Starosta 2015. 
13 In contrast to my reading, Psychopedis (2005, pp. 80–1) sees in the implementation of legal norms to 
regulate the working day an immediate expression of the ‘logic of revolution’ already at work. Writing 
from a broadly understood ‘Open Marxist’ perspective, Psychopedis grounds revolutionary subjectivity 
in the affirmation of a generic human materiality that exists in the mode of being denied, i.e. in an 
alienated social form. On this score, his argument does not substantially differ from that of Bonefeld 
discussed earlier in this article. However, Psychopedis gives the overall argument an idiosyncratic 
twist. In his own words, ‘the dialectical presentation is not simply a matter of contrasting the “bad 
form” with the “good contents”’ (Psychopedis 2005, p. 80). Instead, it is a matter of ‘the demonstration 
that in capitalism the social forces of production become forces of destruction’, so that ‘this form 
poses a real threat to the continued existence of this materiality’ (Ibid). The ground of the revolution is 
thereby seen as residing ‘in the attempt of preserving the conditions of life’ in the face of capitalism’s 
destructive tendencies and the ultimately unstable character of the capitalist state’s direct regulation 
of the material conditions of social reproduction, insofar as ‘in the long run capital cannot tolerate 
regulations that reduce the profit margin’ (Psychopedis 2005, p. 81). As compared to Bonefeld’s 
approach, this train of thought has the merit of acknowledging that the foundation of revolution is not 
contained in the simplest contradiction between human content and reified form, but in a more 
concrete determinate expression of that contradiction. The further dialectical exposition of form-
determinations beyond commodity fetishism thus becomes more meaningful for the discovery of the 
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social foundation of the emergence of the revolutionary subject. Nevertheless, Psychopedis still 
relapses into grounding revolutionary subjectivity in an element which is external to the contradictory 
self-movement of the capital form: revolution is seen as the affirmation of an abstractly self-
determining struggle for society’s survival in response to capital’s destructive barbarism. Thus, the 
necessity of revolution is not immanently carried by the capital form; instead it is carried by the 
reproductive conditions of an abstractly conceived ‘society’ lacking in form-determinations, whose 
existence is ‘thwarted’ by its subsumption under the capital form. In the end, Psychopedis’s account 
comes down to a more sophisticated version of Luxemburg’s ‘socialism or barbarism’, i.e. of the 
classical Marxist view of socialism as the ‘only salvation for humanity’ in the face of ‘war, famine and 
disease’ (Luxemburg 1971, p. 367).      
14 Note, however, that Marx’s respective presentations of this question in Capital and the Grundrisse 
differ in focus. While in the former text he rather one-sidedly unfolds this tendency for the production 
of universal productive subjects as it results from the increasing degradation of the wage-workers’ 
particularistic dimension of their productive subjectivity, albeit meagerly offset by the compulsory 
elementary education clauses contained in the Factory Legislation (Marx 1976, pp. 545, 614-18), in the 
1857-8 manuscript he offers a fuller picture of these determinations by also bringing to light the 
opposite movement of universalistic scientific expansion of human productive subjectivity which is 
entailed by the system of machinery (Marx 1993, pp. 699-700, 705-6, 709). In this sense, a systematic 
development of the grounds of revolutionary subjectivity in the real subsumption requires that both 
text be read together. For a more detailed treatment of this point, see Starosta (2015, Chapters 8 and 
9).     
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